NYU Law Professor Jennifer Arlen and Off the Record Corporate Crime

Deadly Clear:

Too good to miss.

Originally posted on Justice League:

What happens if there’s a conference on corporate crime and nobody hears about it?

Did it happen?

It did.

It happened on April 4 and 5, 2014 at New York University School of Law.

The conference — Deterring Corporate Crime: Effective Principles for Corporate Enforcement – was the brainchild of Jennifer Arlen, co-chair of the NYU Law Program on Corporate Compliance and Enforcement. The conference was co-sponsored by the American Law Institute.

Food for the event was provided by Jules Kroll and his firm K2 Intelligence.

Reporters were not invited or allowed in.

As a result, there was no reporting on the conference.

And not that reporters wouldn’t have loved to have been there.

You had some of biggest names in the field.

You had your prosecutors — including Preet Bharara, Benjamin Lawsky, Andrew Ceresney, Denis McInerney, Jeffrey Knox.

You had your defense attorneys — including Lanny Breuer (Covington &…

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MERS – TOO MANY DEAD DUCKS

Deadly Clear:

013627-yahoo-nsa-watching-091314Since Yahoo seems to have a problem allowing the links to this post be emailed – it must be hitting a very hot button and time to Reblog the information.

Originally posted on Deadly Clear:

patent_officeWhile fishing for bank-related patents this gem surfaced and jumped into the net.  At first it wasn’t apparent it was a keeper because the UETA issue has not been in the forefront of foreclosure defense. However, taking the time to dissect the document it became apparent that, as some of us have suspected, there is a mandatory methodology from the origination of the mortgage loan on a trip to the securitized trust that includes the EXPLICIT CONSENT of the obligor (homeowner).

Yup… The road to securitization needs an electronic record that the “issuer” aka the “obligor” has explicitly consented to at the time of origination. Yeah, ya think maybe that was the real intention of MERS aka Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc.? But it looks like it didn’t have all its ducks in a row. This is a lot to digest – but you need to know and understand…

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Behind the Securitization Curtain – 21st Century Mortgage Casino

Deadly Clear:

This is worth reviewing again.

Originally posted on Deadly Clear:

The turn of the century mortgage lending fiasco was built like a 21st Century casino.
The entire scheme started with the homeowner who wanted to buy a home or refinance at unbelievable interest rates… too good to be true… and they were!

It all started with a loan application called a “1003.”  EVERY lender in the scheme used the same loan application software.  In fact, Fannie Mae patented the sucker. Inside this specific patent are numerous patents related to and referenced that make up the beloved 1003 loan application. These patents are listed on line in the USPTO.

One of the reference patents is a gem called the “Online system for fulfiling loan applications from loan originators” and it describes how technological methodology is integrated into the mortgage lending process.  

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Morgan Stanley : to pay $95 million in U.S. mortgage-debt settlement

Deadly Clear:

Do you think that since they sold the applications of borrowers to the investment banks that maybe these were actually securities sales, rather than traditional mortgages? If you found out you were unwittingly participating in a securities fraud scheme – what would you do?

Originally posted on Justice League:

Morgan Stanley has agreed to pay $95 million (59 million pounds) to resolve a lawsuit accusing the Wall Street bank of misleading investors in mortgage-backed securities in the run up to the 2008 financial crisis.

The settlement, disclosed in court papers filed Monday in New York federal court, follows years of litigation by investors over allegedly false and misleading statements over the soured securities.

The deal stemmed from a lawsuit pursued by the Public Employees’ Retirement System of Mississippi (MissPERS) and the West Virginia Investment Management Board.

The plaintiffs accused Morgan Stanley of violating U.S. securities law in packaging and selling mortgage backed securities in 13 offerings in 2006 and 16 offerings in 2007.

 

Read on.

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Courts Have Ability To Issue Sanctions In Foreclosure Cases

Originally posted on Justice League:

In response to the insightful article by Daniel Wise, “Panel Shifts Toward Remedy in ‘Sarmiento,'” (Aug. 29), I would raise one small point. Wise lamented that “The 2009 New York law (mandating settlement conferences in foreclosure cases) specifically instructed the Judiciary to issue rules to ‘ensure’ that judges have ‘the necessary authority and power’ to see that ‘conferences not be unduly delayed or subject to willful dilatory tactics,'” but that “the Judiciary has taken no action on the Legislature’s command.”

What the Legislature actually stated was “The chief administrator of the courts shall … promulgate such additional rules as may be necessary to ensure the just and expeditious processing of all settlement conferences authorized hereunder.”1

Although banks and mortgage servicers have argued in a number of cases that the failure of the chief administrator to have issued rules specifying what sanctions might be imposed for failing to…

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Finally, Wall Street gets put on trial: We can still hold the 0.1 percent responsible for tanking the economy

Deadly Clear:

Oh, it wouldn’t be so hard to convince a jury…once you inform the jury that the investors were primarily pension funds that had pertinent criteria for investing: (1) the investments must be liquid, and (2) the bond investments must be rated Triple A. In order to be liquid, defaults and refinances must occur so underwriting guidelines were significantly relaxed (FUND ‘EM) on purpose to fill the trusts with loans that would likely default and insurance would payoff. When loans did not default quick enough, more credit and refinances were offered (dangled) with refined sales pitches encouraging the homeowner to take on more debt for a short period of time in order to get a better interest rate and 30 year fixed loan. These sales pitches were so perfected and convincing that homeowners didn’t even question or maybe they would have found out that they were actually participating in a Wall Street securities scheme.

The bonds were erroneously rated Triple A when there was no way they were anywhere near Triple A – that issue has been well documented by numerous lawsuits against the rating companies. It appears no one took the time to see if the actual loan documents had been timely assigned to the trusts, either because they were in on it and knew that they had not been assigned – or the regulators, insurance and rating companies were negligent idiots.

Show the jury the patents created by Fannie and the banks, explain the scheme and bring in several dozen homeowners from around the country and when they all start telling the same story – the pieces of the puzzle fit like a glove. It shouldn’t be very hard to convince a jury – just take a look at the multi-million dollar awards homeowners have been given once they do finally make it to a jury trial.

Originally posted on Justice League:

dimon_prison

The Tea Party regards Barack Obama as a kind of devil figure, but when it comes to hunting down the fraudsters responsible for the economic disaster of the last six years, his administration has stuck pretty close to the Tea Party script. The initial conservative reaction to the disaster, you will recall, was to blame the crisis on the people at the bottom,

on minorities and proletarians lost in an orgy of financial misbehavior. Sure enough, when taking on ordinary people who got loans during the real-estate bubble, the president’s Department of Justice has shown admirable devotion to duty, filing hundreds of mortgage-fraud cases against small-timers.

But high-ranking financiers? Obama’s Department of Justice has thus far shown virtually no interest in holding leading bankers criminally accountable for what went on in the last decade. That is ruled out not only by the Too Big to Jail doctrine that top-ranking…

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Banks unsure if mortgage bonds count as liquidity coverage

Deadly Clear:

The banks wrote more loans than they can legally hold. Watch for more legislation in their favor and lobbing on this subject.

Originally posted on Justice League:

New banking regulations require large financial institutions to hold enough “easy-to-sell assets,” in order to survive an economic crisis.

Now, the big banks are uncertain whether or not their $1.1 trillion of aggregated mortgage debt qualifies as this type of asset, according to an article in Bloomberg.

The headline of the article states, that as a result, the new banking regulations leave the largest financial institutions “guessing” about what counts as liquidity and what does not:

Left unclear was whether some or all of a type of bonds known as agency collateralized mortgage obligations can count toward the liquidity coverage ratio approved this week by U.S. banking regulators.

The government-backed debt, which isn’t explicitly mentioned in the rule, represents a big part of bank holdings. Wall Street banks create the investments by bundling existing bonds into notes with varying risks, meaning they help support the broader mortgage-backed securities market that funds and…

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