REMINDER: Sunday Broadcast on The Foreclosure Hour

Clouded Titles Blog

To all of our dedicated followers who are fighting corruption in our courts and land records, take to heart the following video presentation.

Robert Janes’s videos on “UCC & Foreclosure Defense” will soon come to the Clouded Titles website.  Both Bob and I feel that more education is needed to keep homeowners and their attorneys in the fight … here’s Mr. Janes’ comments:

Robert M. Janes, J.D. on Foreclosure Fraud and our Nation’s Courts

Once again, we remind you to tune into this historic broadcast on Sunday, as The Foreclosure Hour Host Gary Victor Dubin and Hawaii Governor John Waihee talk to Osceola County Clerk of the Circuit Court Armando Ramirez, Forensic Examiner Hector Acosta and myself on this hour-long program.  This is the show you do NOT want to miss!   You can access the program through TheForeclosureHour.com.

Already, I have had numerous people email and call me…

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2 thoughts on “REMINDER: Sunday Broadcast on The Foreclosure Hour

  1. 24 Responses

    david belanger (@revolutionnow1), on August 5, 2015 at 9:59 am said:
    CASE LAW ABOUT RESCISSION
    It is not necessary for rescission of a contract that the party making the misrepresentation should have known that it was false, but recovery is allowed even though misrepresentation is innocently made, because it would be unjust to allow one who made false representations, even innocently, to retain the fruits of a bargain induced by such representations.” Whipp v. Iverson, 43 Wis. 2d 166, 168 N.W.2d 201 (1969).
    “A bank is not the holder in due course upon merely crediting the depositors account.” Bankers Trust v. Nagler, 23 A.D.2d 645, 257 N.Y.S.2d 298 (1965).
    “Any conduct capable of being turned into a statement of fact is representation. There is no distinction between misrepresentations effected by words and misrepresentations effected by other acts.” (The seller or lender) “He is liable, not upon any idea of benefit to himself, but because of his wrongful act and the consequent injury to the other party.” Leonard v. Springer, 197 Ill 532. 64 NE 299 (1902).
    “If any part of the consideration for a promise be illegal, or if there are several considerations for an un-severable promise one of which is illegal, the promise, whether written or oral, is wholly void, as it is impossible to say what part or which one of the considerations induced the promise.” Menominee River Co. v. Augustus Spies L & C Co.,147 Wis. 559 at p. 572; 132 NW 1118 (1912).
    “The contract is void if it is only in part connected with the illegal transaction and the promise single or entire.” Guardian Agency v. Guardian Mut. Savings Bank, 227 Wis. 550, 279 NW 79 (1938).
    “It is not necessary for rescission of a contract that the party making the misrepresentation should have known that it was false, but recovery is allowed even though misrepresentation is innocently made, because it would be unjust to allow one who made false representations, even innocently, to retain the fruits of a bargain induced by such representations.” Whipp v. Iverson, 43 Wis.2d 166, 279 N.W. 79 (1938).
    In a Debtor’s RICO action against its creditor, alleging that the creditor had collected an unlawful debt, an interest rate (where all loan charges were added together) that exceeded, in the language of the RICO Statute, “twice the enforceable rate.” The Court found no reason to impose a requirement that the Plaintiff show that the Defendant had been convicted of collecting an unlawful debt, running a “loan sharking” operation. The debt included the fact that exaction of a usurious interest rate rendered the debt unlawful and that is all that is necessary to support the Civil RICO action. Durante Bros. & Sons, Inc. v. Flushing Nat ‘l Bank, 755 F.2d 239 (1985). Cert. denied, 473 U.S. 906 (1985).
    The Supreme Court found that the Plaintiff in a civil RICO action need establish only a criminal “violation” and not a criminal conviction. Further, the Court held that the Defendant need only have caused harm to the Plaintiff by the commission of a predicate offense in such a way as to constitute a “pattern of Racketeering activity.” That is, the Plaintiff need not demonstrate that the Defendant is an organized crime figure, a mobster in the popular sense, or that the Plaintiff has suffered some type of special Racketeering injury; all that the Plaintiff must show is what the Statute specifically requires. The RICO Statute and the civil remedies for its violation are to be liberally construed to affect the congressional purpose as broadly formulated in the Statute. Sedima, SPRL v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479, 105 S. Ct. 3275, 87 L. Ed. 2d 346 (1985).
    A violation such as not responding to the TILA rescission letter, no matter how technical, it has no discretion with respect to liability. Holding that creditor failed to make material disclosures in connection with loan. Title 15 USCS §1605(c) Wright v. Mid-Penn Consumer Discount Co., 133 B.R. 704 (Pa. 1991).
    Moore v. Mid-Penn Consumer Discount Co., Civil Action No. 90-6452 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10324 (Pa. 1991).
    The court held that, under TILA’s Regulation Z, 12 CFR §226.4 (a), a lender had to expressly notify a
    borrower that he had a choice of insurer.
    Marshall v. Security State Bank of Hamilton, 121 B.R. 814 (Ill. 1990) violation of Federal Truth in Lending
    15 USCS §1638(a)(9), and Regulation Z. The bank took a security interest in the vehicle without
    disclosing the security interest.
    Steinbrecher v. Mid-Penn Consumer Discount Co., 110 B.R. 155 (Pa. 1990). Mid-Penn violated TILA by not
    including in a finance charge the debtors’ purchase of fire insurance on their home. The purchase of
    such insurance was a condition imposed by the company. The cost of the insurance was added to the
    amount financed and not to the finance charge.
    Nichols v. Mid-Penn Consumer Discount Co., 1989 WL 46682 (Pa. 1989). Mid-Penn misinformed Nichols in
    the Notice of Right to Cancel Mortgage.
    McElvany v. Household Finance Realty Corp., 98 B.R. 237 (Pa. 1989). debtor filed an application to remove the
    mortgage foreclosure proceedings to the United States District Court pursuant to 28 USCS §1409. It is strict
    liability in the sense that absolute compliance is required and even technical violations will form the basis for
    liability. Lauletta v. Valley Buick Inc., 421 F. Supp. 1036 at 1040 (Pa. 1976).
    Johnson-Allen v. Lomas and Nettleton Co., 67 B.R. 968 (Pa. 1986). Violation of Truth-in-Lending Act
    requirements, 15 USCS §1638(a)(10), required mortgagee to provide a statement containing a
    description of any security interest held or to be retained or acquired. Failure to disclose.
    Cervantes v. General Electric Mortgage Co., 67 B.R. 816 (Pa. 1986). creditor failed to meet disclosure
    requirements under the Truth in Lending Act, 15 U.S.C.S. § 1601-1667c and Regulation Z of the
    Federal Reserve Board, 12 CFR §226.1
    McCausland v. GMAC Mortgage Co., 63 B.R. 665, (Pa. 1986). GMAC failed to provide information which
    must be disclosed as defined in the TILA and Regulation Z, 12 CFR §226.1
    Perry v. Federal National Mortgage Corp., 59 B.R. 947 (Pa. 1986) the disclosure statement was deficient
    under the Truth In Lending Act, 15 U.S.C.S. § 1638(a)(9). Defendant Mortgage Co. failed to reveal
    clearly what security interest was retained.
    Schultz v. Central Mortgage Co., 58 B.R. 945 (Pa. 1986). The court determined creditor mortgagor violated
    the Truth In Lending Act, 15 U.S.C.S. § 1638(a)(3), by its failure to include the cost of mortgage
    insurance in calculating the finance charge. The court found creditor failed to meet any of the
    conditions for excluding such costs and was liable for twice the amount of the true finance charge.
    Solis v. Fidelity Consumer Discount Co., 58 B.R. 983 (Pa. 1986). Any misgivings creditors may have about the
    technical nature of the requirements should be addressed to Congress or the Federal Reserve Board, not the
    courts. Disclosure requirements for credit sales are governed by 15 U.S.C.S. § 1638 12 CFR § 226.8(b), (c).
    Disclosure requirements for consumer loans are governed by 15 U.S.C.S. § 1639 12 CFR § 226.8(b), (d). A
    violator of the disclosure requirements is held to a standard of strict liability. Therefore, a plaintiff need not
    show that the creditor in fact deceived him by making substandard disclosures. Since Transworld Systems Inc.
    have not cancelled the security interest and return all monies paid by Ms. Sherrie I. LaForce within the 20 days
    of receipt of the letter of rescission of October 7, 2009, the lenders named above are responsible for actual and
    statutory damages pursuant to 15 U.S.C. 1640(a).
    Lewis v. Dodge, 620 F.Supp. 135, 138 (D. Conn. 1985);
    Porter v. Mid-Penn Consumer Discount Co., 961 F.2d 1066 (3rd Cir. 1992). Porter filed an adversary proceeding against appellant under 15 U.S.C. §1635, for failure to honor her request to rescind a loan secured by a mortgage on her home.
    Rowland v. Magna Millikin Bank of Decatur, N.A., 812 F.Supp. 875 (1992) Even technical violations will form the basis for liability. The mortgagors had a right to rescind the contract in accordance with 15 U.S.C. §1635(c).
    New Maine Nat. Bank v. Gendron, 780 F.Supp. 52 (1992). The court held that defendants were entitled to rescind loan under strict liability terms of TILA because plaintiff violated TILA’s provisions.
    Dixon v. S & S Loan Service of Waycross, Inc., 754 F.Supp. 1567 (1990); TILA is a remedial statute, and, hence, is liberally construed in favor of borrowers. The remedial objectives of TILA are achieved by imposing a system of strict liability in favor of consumers when mandated disclosures have not been made. Thus, liability will flow from even minute deviations from the requirements of the statute and the regulations promulgated under it.
    Woolfolk v. Van Ru Credit Corp., 783 F.Supp. 724 (1990) There was no dispute as to the material facts that established that the debt collector violated the FDCPA. The court granted the debtors’ motion for summary judgment and held that (1) under 15 U.S.C. §1692(e), a debt collector could not use any false, deceptive, or misleading representation or means in connection with the collection of any debt; Unfair Debt Collection Practices Act.
    Jenkins v. Landmark Mortg. Corp. of Virginia, 696 F.Supp. 1089 (W.D. Va. 1988). Plaintiff was also misinformed regarding the effects of a rescission. The pertinent regulation states that “when a consumer rescinds a transaction, the security interest giving rise to the right of rescission becomes void and the consumer shall not be liable for any amount, including any finance charge.” 12 CFR §226.23(d) (1)..
    Laubach v. Fidelity Consumer Discount Co., 686 F.Supp. 504 (E.D. Pa. 1988). monetary damages for the plaintiffs pursuant to the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organization Act, 18 USC §1961. (Count I); the Truth-in-Lending Act, 15 USC §1601.
    Searles v. Clarion Mortg. Co., 1987 WL 61932 (E.D. Pa. 1987); Liability will flow from even minute deviations from requirements of the statute and Regulation Z. failure to accurately disclose the property in which a security interest was taken in connection with a consumer credit transaction involving the purchase of residential real estate in violation of 15 USCs §1638(a)(9). and 12 CFR §226.18(m).
    Dixon v. S & S Loan Service of Waycross, Inc., 754 F.Supp. 1567, 1570 (S.D. Ga. 1990). Congress’s purpose in passing the Truth in Lending Act (TILA), 15 USCs §1601(a). was to assure a meaningful disclosure of credit terms so that the consumer will be able to compare more readily the various credit terms available to him. 15 USCs §1601(a). TILA is a remedial statute, and, hence, is liberally construed in favor of borrowers.;
    Shroder v. Suburban Coastal Corp., 729 F.2d 1371, 1380 (11th Cir. 1984). disclosure statement violated 12 CFR §226.6(a).,
    Wright v. Mid-Penn Consumer Discount Co., 133 B.R. 704 (E.D. Pa. 1991) Holding that creditor failed to make material disclosures in connection with one loan;
    Cervantes v. General Electric Mortgage Co., 67 B.R. 816 (E.D. Pa. 1986). The court found that the TILA violations were governed by a strict liability standard, and defendant’s failure to reveal in the disclosure
    statement the exact nature of the security interest violated the TILA.
    Perry v. Federal National Mortgage, 59 B.R. 947 (E.D. Pa. 1986). Defendant failed to accurately disclose the security interest taken to secure the loan.
    Porter v. Mid-Penn Consumer Discount Co., 961 F.2d 1066 (3rd Cir. 1992). Adversary proceeding against appellant under 15 U.S.C. §1635, for failure to honor her request to rescind a loan secured by a mortgage on her home. She was entitled to the equitable relief of rescission and the statutory remedies under 15 U.S.C. §1640 for appellant’s failure to rescind upon request.
    Solis v. Fidelity Consumer Discount Co., 58 B.R. 983 (Pa. 1986). Any misgivings creditors may have about the technical nature of the requirements should be addressed to Congress or the Federal Reserve Board, not the courts. Disclosure requirements for credit sales are governed by 15 U.S.C.S. § 1638 12 CFR § 226.8(b), (c). Disclosure requirements for consumer loans are governed by 15 U.S.C.S. § 1639 12 CFR § 226.8(b), (d). A violator of the disclosure requirements is held to a standard of strict liability. Therefore, a plaintiff need not show that the creditor in fact deceived him by making substandard disclosures. Rowland v. Magna Millikin Bank of Decatur, N.A., 812 F.Supp. 875 (1992),
    Even technical violations will form the basis for liability. The mortgagors had a right to rescind the contract in accordance with 15 U.S.C. §1635(c). New Maine Nat. Bank v. Gendron, 780 F.Supp. 52 (D. Me. 1992). The court held that defendants were entitled to rescind loan under strict liability terms of TILA because plaintiff violated TILA’s provisions.

  2. Legal Notices
    CAVEAT EMPTOR NOTICE – BUYER BEWARE!
    NOTICE TO ALL PARTIES: Be advised litigation is pending in Federal Court Docket 1:15-cv-
    00028-WMS (WDNY) and LIS PENDENS filed Index No.807348/2014 on 1/20/2015 has been
    RECORDED property a 6853 Erie Road Evans New York SBL 192.20-8-26.1 OWNER OF
    THE Account Deborah Ann Buczek
     “The maxim … operates as between purchaser and vendor (and) instructs the potential
    purchaser to rely upon his own investigations, inspections and inquiries.
     Spivey v. Adaptive Marketing, 660 F. Supp. 2d 940( United States District Court,
    Illinois, 2009)
     Winnipeg Condominium Corporation No. 36 v. Bird Construction Co., [1995] 1 S.C.R.
    85
    According to: 1868 U.S. Dist. Lexis 265::In re Kerosene Oil Co.: Nov. 1868 The Federal
    Court(s) Have jurisdiction to restrain the Mortgagees from proceeding in the action
    See U.S. v. PhillipsC.A.4 (N.C.) | July 16, 1999 | 185 F.3d 183 W.D.N.Y. | August 20, 2012 |
    1.) 890 F.Supp.2d Tachiquin v. HSBC Bank USA S.D.Cal. | November 14, 2012 | Not
    Reported in F.Supp.2d
    2.) Nixon v. Individual Head of St. Joseph Mort. Co., Inc. N.D.Ind. | June 26, 1985
    3.) 612 F.Supp. 253 Ungar v. MandellC.A.2 (N.Y.) | December 06, 1972 | 471 F…2d 1163
    “MEMORANDUM OPINION BRIEF
    STATEMENTS BY A JUDGE ANNOUNCING his/her RULING”
    JURISDICTION:
    1.) Patton v. Diemer, 35 Ohio St. 3d 68; 518 N.E.2d 941; 1988). A judgment rendered by a court
    lacking subject matter jurisdiction is void A ab initio. Consequently, the authority to vacate a
    void judgment is not derived from Ohio R. Civ. P. 60(B), but rather constitutes an inherent
    power possessed by Ohio courts. I see no evidence to the contrary that this would apply to ALL
    courts.
    2.) “A party lacks standing to invoke the jurisdiction of a court unless he has, in an individual or
    a representative capacity, some real interest in the subject matter of the action. Lebanon
    Correctional Institution v. Court of Common Pleas 35 Ohio St.2d 176 (1973).
    3.) “A party lacks standing to invoke the jurisdiction of a court unless he has, in an individual or
    a representative capacity, some real interest in the subject matter of an action.” Wells Fargo
    Bank, v. Byrd, 178 Ohio App.3d 285, 2008-Ohio-4603, 897 N.E.2d 722 (2008). It went on to
    hold,” If plaintiff has offered no evidence that it owned the note and mortgage when the
    complaint was filed, it would not be entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” (The following
    court case was unpublished and hidden from the public)
    4.) Wells Fargo, Litton Loan v. Farmer, 867 N.Y.S.2d 21 (2008). “Wells Fargo does not own the
    mortgage loan. Therefore, the matter is dismissed with prejudice.” (The following court case was
    unpublished and hidden from the public)
    5.) Wells Fargo v. Reyes, 867 N.Y.S.2d 21 (2008). Dismissed with prejudice, Fraud on Court &
    Sanctions. Wells Fargo never owned the Mortgage. (The following court case was unpublished
    and hidden from the public)
    6.) Deutsche Bank v. Peabody, 866 N.Y.S.2d 91 (2008). EquiFirst, when making the loan,
    violated Regulation Z of the Federal Truth in Lending Act 15 USC §1601 and the Fair Debt
    Collections Practices Act 15 USC §1692; “intentionally created fraud in the factum” and
    withheld from plaintiff “vital information concerning said debt and all of the matrix involved in
    making the loan”.
    7.) (The following court case was unpublished and hidden from the public) Indymac Bank v.
    Boyd, 880 N.Y.S.2d 224 (2009). To establish a prima facie case in an action to foreclose a
    mortgage, the plaintiff must establish the existence of the mortgage and the mortgage note. It is
    the law’s policy to allow only an aggrieved person to bring a lawsuit . . . A want of “standing to
    sue,” in other words, is just another way of saying that this particular plaintiff is not involved in a
    genuine controversy, and a simple syllogism takes us from there to a “jurisdictional” dismissal:
    8.) (The following court case was unpublished and hidden from the public) Indymac Bank v.
    Bethley, 880 N.Y.S.2d 873 (2009). The Court is concerned that there may be fraud on the part of
    plaintiff or at least malfeasance Plaintiff INDYMAC (Deutsche) and must have “standing” to
    bring this action.
    9.) (The following court case was unpublished and hidden from the public) Deutsche Bank
    National Trust Co v.Torres, NY Slip Op 51471U (2009). That “the dead cannot be sued” is a
    well established principle of the jurisprudence of this state plaintiff’s second cause of action for
    declaratory relief is denied. To be entitled to a default judgment, the movant must establish,
    among other things, the existence of facts which give rise to viable claims against the defaulting
    defendants. “The doctrine of ultra vires is a most powerful weapon to keep private corporations
    within their legitimate spheres and punish them for violations of their corporate charters, and it
    probably is not invoked too often. “ Zinc Carbonate Co. v. First National Bank, 103 Wis. 125, 79
    NW 229 (1899). Also see: American Express Co. v. Citizens State Bank, 181 Wis. 172, 194 NW
    427 (1923).
    10.) (The following court case was unpublished and hidden from the public) Wells Fargo v.
    Reyes, 867 N.Y.S.2d 21 (2008). Case dismissed with prejudice, fraud on the Court and Sanctions
    because Wells Fargo never owned the Mortgage nor the note was lost.
    11.) (The following court case was unpublished and hidden from the public) Wells Fargo, Litton
    Loan v. Farmer, 867 N.Y.S.2d 21 (2008). Wells Fargo does not own the mortgage loan nor the
    note. “Indeed, no more than (affidavits) is necessary to make the prima facie case.” United States
    v. Kis, 658 F.2d, 526 (7th Cir. 1981).
    12.) (The following court case was unpublished and hidden from the public) Indymac Bank v.
    Bethley, 880 N.Y.S.2d 873 (2009). The Court is concerned that there may be fraud on the part of
    plaintiff or at least malfeasance Plaintiff INDYMAC (Deutsche) and must have “standing” to
    bring this action.
    13.) Lawyer responsible for false debt collection claim Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, 15
    USCS §§ 1692-1692o, Heintz v. Jenkins, 514 U.S. 291; 115 S. Ct. 1489, 131 L. Ed. 2d 395
    (1995). and FDCPA Title 15 U.S.C. sub section 1692.
    14.) In determining whether the plaintiffs come before this Court with clean hands, the primary
    factor to be considered is whether the plaintiffs sought to mislead or deceive the other party, not
    whether that party relied upon plaintiffs’ misrepresentations. Stachnik v. Winkel, 394 Mich. 375,
    387; 230 N.W.2d 529, 534 (1975).
    15.) “Indeed, no more than (affidavits) is necessary to make the prima facie case.” United States
    v. Kis, 658 F.2d, 526 (7th Cir. 1981). Cert Denied, 50 U.S. L.W. 2169; S. Ct. March 22, (1982).
    16.) “Silence can only be equated with fraud where there is a legal or moral duty to speak or
    when an inquiry left unanswered would be intentionally misleading.”U.S. v. Tweel, 550 F.2d
    297 (1977).
    17.) “If any part of the consideration for a promise be illegal, or if there are several
    considerations for an un-severable promise one of which is illegal, the promise, whether written
    or oral, is wholly void, as it is impossible to say what part or which one of the considerations
    induced the promise.” Menominee River Co. v. Augustus Spies L & C Co., 147 Wis. 559 at p.
    572; 132 NW 1118 (1912).
    18.) Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 17(a)(1) which requires that “[a]n action must be
    prosecuted in the name of the real party in interest.” See also, In re Jacobson, 402 B.R. 359, 365-
    66 (Bankr. W.D. Wash. 2009); In re Hwang, 396 B.R. 757, 766-67 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 2008).
    19.) Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc. v. Chong, 824 N.Y.S.2d 764 (2006). MERS
    did not have standing as a real party in interest under the Rules to file the motion.The declaration
    also failed to assert that MERS, FMC Capital LLC or Homecomings Financial, LLC held the
    Note.
    20.) Landmark National Bank v. Kesler, 289 Kan. 528, 216 P.3d 158 (2009). “Kan. Stat. Ann. §
    60-260(b) allows relief from a judgment based on mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable
    neglect; newly discovered evidence that could not have been timely discovered with due
    diligence; fraud or misrepresentation; a void judgment; a judgment that has been satisfied,
    released, discharged, or is no longer equitable; or any other reason justifying relief from the
    operation of the judgment. The relationship that the registry had to the bank was more akin to
    that of a straw man than to a party possessing all the rights given a buyer.” Also In September of
    2008, A California Judge ruling against MERS concluded, “There is no evidence before the court
    as to who is the present owner of the Note. The holder of the Note must join in the motion.”
    21.) LaSalle Bank v. Ahearn, 875 N.Y.S.2d 595 (2009). Dismissed with prejudice.Lack of
    standing.
    22.) Novastar Mortgage, Inc v. Snyder 3:07CV480 (2008). Plaintiff has the burden of
    establishing its standing. It has failed to do so.
    23.) DLJ Capital, Inc. v. Parsons, CASE NO. 07-MA-17 (2008). A genuine issue of material fact
    existed as to whether or not appellee was the real party in interest as there was no evidence on
    the record of an assignment. Reversed for lack of standing.
    24.) Everhome Mortgage Company v. Rowland, No. 07AP-615 (Ohio 2008). Mortgagee was not
    the real party in interest pursuant to Rule 17(a).Lack of standing.
    25.) In Lambert v. Firstar Bank, 83 Ark. App. 259, 127 S.W. 3d 523 (2003), complying with the
    Statutory Foreclosure Act does not insulate a financial institution from liability and does not
    prevent a party from timely asserting any claims or defenses it may have concerning a mortgage
    foreclosure A.C.A. §18-50-116(d)(2) and violates honest services Title 18 Fraud. Notice to
    credit reporting agencies of overdue payments/foreclosure on a fraudulent debt is defamation of
    character and a whole separate fraud.
    26.) A Court of Appeals does not consider assertions of error that are unsupported by convincing
    legal authority or argument, unless it is apparent without further research that the argument is
    well taken. FRAUD is a point well taken! Lambert Supra.
    No lawful consideration tendered by Original Lender and/or Subsequent Mortgage and/or
    Servicing Company to support the alleged debt. “A lawful consideration must exist and be
    tendered to support the Note” and demand under TILA full disclosure of any such consideration.
    Anheuser-Busch Brewing Company v. Emma Mason, 44 Minn. 318, 46 N.W. 558 (1890).
    27.) “It has been settled beyond controversy that a national bank, under Federal law, being
    limited in its power and capacity, cannot lend its credit by nor guarantee the debt of another. All
    such contracts being entered into by its officers are ultra vires and not binding upon the
    corporation.” It is unlawful for banks to loan their deposits. Howard & Foster Co. vs. Citizens
    National Bank, 133 S.C. 202, 130 S.E. 758 (1926),
    28.) “Neither, as included in its powers not incidental to them, is it a part of a bank’s business to
    lend its credit. If a bank could lend its credit as well as its money, it might, if it received
    compensation and was careful to put its name only to solid paper, make a great deal more than
    any lawful interest on its money would amount to. If not careful, the power would be the mother
    of panics . . . Indeed, lending credit is the exact opposite of lending money, which is the real
    business of a bank, for while the latter creates a liability in favor of the bank, the former gives
    rise to a liability of the bank to another. I Morse. Banks and Banking 5th Ed. Sec 65; Magee,
    Banks and Banking, 3rd Ed. Sec 248.” American Express Co. v. Citizens State Bank, 181 Wis.
    172, 194 NW 427 (1923). I demand under TILA full disclosure and proof to the contrary.
    29.) UCC § 2-106(4) “Cancellation” occurs when either party puts an end to the contract for
    breach by the other and its effect is the same as that of “termination” except that the canceling
    party also retains any remedy for breach of the whole contract or any unperformed balance.
    NOTE WAS LOST BREACH OF CONTRACT
    N.Y. UCC. LAW § 2–106 : NY Code – Section 2–106: Definitions: “Contract”; “Agreement”;
    “Contract for Sale”; “Sale”; “Present Sale”; “Conforming” to Contract; “Termination”;
    “Cancellation”. (1) In this Article unless the context otherwise requires “contract” and
    “agreement” are limited to those relating to the present or future sale of goods. “Contract for
    sale” includes both a present sale of goods and a contract to sell goods at a future time. A “sale”
    consists in the passing of title from the seller to the buyer for a price (Section 2–401). A
    “present sale” means a sale which is accomplished by the making of the contract.(2) Goods or
    conduct including any part of a performance are “conforming” or conform to the contract
    when they are in accordance with the obligations under the contract.(3) “Termination” occurs
    when either party pursuant to a power created by agreement or law puts an end to the contract
    otherwise than for its breach. On “termination” all obligations which are still executory or
    both sides are discharged but any right based on prior breach or performance survives. (4)
    “Cancellation” occurs when either party puts an end to the contract for breach by the other
    and its effect is the same as that of “termination” except that the cancelling party also retains
    any remedy for breach of the whole contract or any unperformed balance.
    30.) “There is no doubt but what the law is that a national bank cannot lend its credit or become
    an accommodation endorser.” National Bank of Commerce v. Atkinson, 55 F. 465; (1893).
    31.) National Banks and/or subsidiary Mortgage companies cannot retain the note, “Among the
    assets of the state bank were two notes, secured by mortgage, which could not be transferred to
    the new bank as assets under the National Banking Laws. National Bank Act, Sect 28 & 56”
    National Bank of Commerce v. Atkinson, 8 Kan. App. 30, 54 P. 8 (1898).
    32.) “A bank can lend its money, but not its credit.” First Nat’l Bank of Tallapoosa v. Monroe,
    135 Ga 614, 69 S.E. 1123 (1911).
    33.) It is not necessary for rescission of a contract that the party making the misrepresentation
    should have known that it was false, but recovery is allowed even though misrepresentation is
    innocently made, because it would be unjust to allow one who made false representations, even
    innocently, to retain the fruits of a bargain induced by such representations.” Whipp v. Iverson,
    43 Wis. 2d 166, 168 N.W.2d 201 (1969).
    34.) “A bank is not the holder in due course upon merely crediting the depositors account.”
    Bankers Trust v. Nagler, 23 A.D.2d 645, 257 N.Y.S.2d 298 (1965).
    35.) “Any conduct capable of being turned into a statement of fact is representation. There is no
    distinction between misrepresentations effected by words and misrepresentations effected by
    other acts.” (The seller or lender) “He is liable, not upon any idea of benefit to himself, but
    because of his wrongful act and the consequent injury to the other party.” Leonard v. Springer,
    197 Ill 532. 64 NE 299 (1902).
    36.) “If any part of the consideration for a promise be illegal, or if there are several
    considerations for an un-severable promise one of which is illegal, the promise, whether written
    or oral, is wholly void, as it is impossible to say what part or which one of the considerations
    induced the promise.” Menominee River Co. v. Augustus Spies L & C Co.,147 Wis. 559 at p.
    572; 132 NW 1118 (1912).
    37.) “The contract is void if it is only in part connected with the illegal transaction and the
    promise single or entire.” Guardian Agency v. Guardian Mut. Savings Bank, 227 Wis. 550, 279
    NW 79 (1938).
    38.) “It is not necessary for rescission of a contract that the party making the misrepresentation
    should have known that it was false, but recovery is allowed even though misrepresentation is
    innocently made, because it would be unjust to allow one who made false representations, even
    innocently, to retain the fruits of a bargain induced by such representations.” Whipp v. Iverson,
    43 Wis.2d 166, 279 N.W. 79 (1938).
    39.) In a Debtor’s RICO action against its creditor, alleging that the creditor had collected an
    unlawful debt, an interest rate (where all loan charges were added together) that exceeded, in the
    language of the RICO Statute, “twice the enforceable rate.” The Court found no reason to impose
    a requirement that the Plaintiff show that the Defendant had been convicted of collecting an
    unlawful debt, running a “loan sharking” operation. The debt included the fact that exaction of a
    usurious interest rate rendered the debt unlawful and that is all that is necessary to support the
    Civil RICO action. Durante Bros. & Sons, Inc. v. Flushing Nat ‘l Bank, 755 F.2d 239 (1985).
    Cert. denied, 473 U.S. 906 (1985).
    40.) The Supreme Court found that the Plaintiff in a civil RICO action need establish only a
    criminal “violation” and not a criminal conviction. Further, the Court held that the Defendant
    need only have caused harm to the Plaintiff by the commission of a predicate offense in such a
    way as to constitute a “pattern of Racketeering activity.” That is, the Plaintiff need not
    demonstrate that the Defendant is an organized crime figure, a mobster in the popular sense, or
    that the Plaintiff has suffered some type of special Racketeering injury; all that the Plaintiff must
    show is what the Statute specifically requires. The RICO Statute and the civil remedies for its
    violation are to be liberally construed to affect the congressional purpose as broadly formulated
    in the Statute.Sedima, SPRL v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479, 105 S. Ct. 3275, 87 L. Ed. 2d 346
    (1985).
    41.) A violation such as not responding to the TILA rescission letter, no matter how technical, it
    has no discretion with respect to liability. Holding that creditor failed to make material
    disclosures in connection with loan. Title 15 USCS §1605(c) Wright v. Mid-Penn Consumer
    Discount Co., 133 B.R. 704 (Pa. 1991). Moore v. Mid-Penn Consumer Discount Co., Civil
    Action No. 90-6452 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10324 (Pa. 1991). The court held that, under TILA’s
    Regulation Z, 12 CFR §226.4 (a), a lender had to expressly notify a borrower that he had a
    choice of insurer.
    42.) Marshall v. Security State Bank of Hamilton, 121 B.R. 814 (Ill. 1990) violation of Federal
    Truth in Lending 15 USCS §1638(a)(9), and Regulation Z.The bank took a security interest in
    the vehicle without disclosing the security interest.
    43.) Steinbrecher v. Mid-Penn Consumer Discount Co., 110 B.R. 155 (Pa. 1990). Mid-Penn
    violated TILA by not including in a finance charge the debtors’ purchase of fire insurance on
    their home. The purchase of such insurance was a condition imposed by the company. The cost
    of the insurance was added to the amount financed and not to the finance charge.
    44.) Nichols v. Mid-Penn Consumer Discount Co., 1989 WL 46682 (Pa. 1989). Mid-Penn
    misinformed Nichols in the Notice of Right to Cancel Mortgage.
    45.) McElvany v. Household Finance Realty Corp., 98 B.R. 237 (Pa. 1989). debtor filed an
    application to remove the mortgage foreclosure proceedings to the United States District Court
    pursuant to 28 USCS §1409.
    46.) It is strict liability in the sense that absolute compliance is required and even technical
    violations will form the basis for liability. Lauletta v. Valley Buick Inc., 421 F. Supp. 1036 at
    1040 (Pa. 1976).
    47.) Johnson-Allen v. Lomas and Nettleton Co., 67 B.R. 968 (Pa. 1986). Violation of Truth-inLending
    Act requirements, 15 USCS §1638(a)(10), required mortgagee to provide a statement
    containing a description of any security interest held or to be retained or acquired. Failure to
    disclose.
    48.) Cervantes v. General Electric Mortgage Co., 67 B.R. 816 (Pa. 1986). creditor failed to meet
    disclosure requirements under the Truth in Lending Act, 15 U.S.C.S. § 1601-1667c and
    Regulation Z of the Federal Reserve Board, 12 CFR §226.1
    49.) McCausland v. GMAC Mortgage Co., 63 B.R. 665, (Pa. 1986). GMAC failed to provide
    information which must be disclosed as defined in the TILA and Regulation Z, 12 CFR §226.1
    50.) Perry v. Federal National Mortgage Corp., 59 B.R. 947 (Pa. 1986) the disclosure statement
    was deficient under the Truth In Lending Act, 15 U.S.C.S. § 1638(a)(9). Defendant Mortgage
    Co. failed to reveal clearly what security interest was retained.
    51.) Schultz v. Central Mortgage Co., 58 B.R. 945 (Pa. 1986). The court determined creditor
    mortgagor violated the Truth In Lending Act, 15 U.S.C.S. § 1638(a)(3), by its failure to include
    the cost of mortgage insurance in calculating the finance charge. The court found creditor failed
    to meet any of the conditions for excluding such costs and was liable for twice the amount of the
    true finance charge.
    52.) Solis v. Fidelity Consumer Discount Co., 58 B.R. 983 (Pa. 1986). Any misgivings creditors
    may have about the technical nature of the requirements should be addressed to Congress or the
    Federal Reserve Board, not the courts. Disclosure requirements for credit sales are governed by
    15 U.S.C.S. § 1638 12 CFR § 226.8(b), (c). Disclosure requirements for consumer loans are
    governed by 15 U.S.C.S. § 1639 12 CFR § 226.8(b), (d). A violator of the disclosure
    requirements is held to a standard of strict liability. Therefore, a plaintiff need not show that the
    creditor in fact deceived him by making substandard disclosures. Since Transworld Systems Inc.
    have not cancelled the security interest and return all monies paid by Ms. Sherrie I. LaForce
    within the 20 days of receipt of the letter of rescission of October 7, 2009, the lenders named
    above are responsible for actual and statutory damages pursuant to 15 U.S.C. 1640(a).Lewis v.
    Dodge, 620 F.Supp. 135, 138 (D. Conn. 1985);
    53.) Porter v. Mid-Penn Consumer Discount Co., 961 F.2d 1066 (3rd Cir. 1992). Porter filed an
    adversary proceeding against appellant under 15 U.S.C. §1635, for failure to honor her request
    to rescind a loan secured by a mortgage on her home.
    54.) Rowland v. Magna Millikin Bank of Decatur, N.A., 812 F.Supp. 875 (1992) Even technical
    violations will form the basis for liability. The mortgagors had a right to rescind the contract in
    accordance with 15 U.S.C. §1635(c).
    55.) New Maine Nat. Bank v. Gendron, 780 F.Supp. 52 (1992). The court held that defendants
    were entitled to rescind loan under strict liability terms of TILA because plaintiff violated
    TILA’s provisions.
    56.) Dixon v. S & S Loan Service of Waycross, Inc., 754 F.Supp. 1567 (1990); TILA is a
    remedial statute, and, hence, is liberally construed in favor of borrowers. The remedial objectives
    of TILA are achieved by imposing a system of strict liability in favor of consumers when
    mandated disclosures have not been made. Thus, liability will flow from even minute deviations
    from the requirements of the statute and the regulations promulgated under it.
    57.) Woolfolk v. Van Ru Credit Corp., 783 F.Supp. 724 (1990) There was no dispute as to the
    material facts that established that the debt collector violated the FDCPA. The court granted the
    debtors’ motion for summary judgment and held that (1) under 15 U.S.C. §1692(e), a debt
    collector could not use any false, deceptive, or misleading representation or means in connection
    with the collection of any debt; Unfair Debt Collection Practices Act.
    58.) Jenkins v. Landmark Mortg. Corp. of Virginia, 696 F.Supp. 1089 (W.D. Va. 1988). Plaintiff
    was also misinformed regarding the effects of a rescission. The pertinent regulation states that
    “when a consumer rescinds a transaction, the security interest giving rise to the right of
    rescission becomes void and the consumer shall not be liable for any amount, including any
    finance charge.” 12 CFR §226.23(d) (1)..
    59.) Laubach v. Fidelity Consumer Discount Co., 686 F.Supp. 504 (E.D. Pa. 1988). monetary
    damages for the plaintiffs pursuant to the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organization Act, 18
    USC §1961. (Count I); the Truth-in-Lending Act, 15 USC §1601.
    60.) Searles v. Clarion Mortg. Co., 1987 WL 61932 (E.D. Pa. 1987); Liability will flow from
    even minute deviations from requirements of the statute and Regulation Z. failure to accurately
    disclose the property in which a security interest was taken in connection with a consumer credit
    transaction involving the purchase of residential real estate in violation of 15 USCs §1638(a)(9).
    and 12 CFR §226.18(m).
    61.) Dixon v. S & S Loan Service of Waycross, Inc., 754 F.Supp. 1567, 1570 (S.D. Ga. 1990).
    Congress’s purpose in passing the Truth in Lending Act (TILA), 15 USCs §1601(a). was to
    assure a meaningful disclosure of credit terms so that the consumer will be able to compare more
    readily the various credit terms available to him. 15 USCs §1601(a). TILA is a remedial statute,
    and, hence, is liberally construed in favor of borrowers.;
    62.) Shroder v. Suburban Coastal Corp., 729 F.2d 1371, 1380 (11th Cir. 1984). disclosure
    statement violated 12 CFR §226.6(a).,
    Wright v. Mid-Penn Consumer Discount Co., 133 B.R. 704 (E.D. Pa. 1991) Holding that
    creditor failed to make material disclosures in connection with one loan;
    63.) Cervantes v. General Electric Mortgage Co., 67 B.R. 816 (E.D. Pa. 1986). The court found
    that the TILA violations were governed by a strict liability standard, and defendant’s failure to
    reveal in the disclosure statement the exact nature of the security interest violated the TILA.
    64.) Perry v. Federal National Mortgage, 59 B.R. 947 (E.D. Pa. 1986). Defendant failed to
    accurately disclose the security interest taken to secure the loan.
    65.) Porter v. Mid-Penn Consumer Discount Co., 961 F.2d 1066 (3rd Cir. 1992). Adversary
    proceeding against appellant under 15 U.S.C. §1635, for failure to honor her request to rescind a
    loan secured by a mortgage on her home. She was entitled to the equitable relief of rescission
    and the statutory remedies under 15 U.S.C. §1640 for appellant’s failure to rescind upon request.
    66.) Solis v. Fidelity Consumer Discount Co., 58 B.R. 983 (Pa. 1986). Any misgivings creditors
    may have about the technical nature of the requirements should be addressed to Congress or the
    Federal Reserve Board, not the courts. Disclosure requirements for credit sales are governed by
    15 U.S.C.S. § 1638 12 CFR § 226.8(b), (c). Disclosure requirements for consumer loans are
    governed by 15 U.S.C.S. § 1639 12 CFR § 226.8(b), (d). A violator of the disclosure
    requirements is held to a standard of strict liability. Therefore, a plaintiff need not show that the
    creditor in fact deceived him by making substandard disclosures. Rowland v. Magna Millikin
    Bank of Decatur, N.A., 812 F.Supp. 875 (1992),
    67.) Even technical violations will form the basis for liability. The mortgagors had a right to
    rescind the contract in accordance with 15 U.S.C. §1635(c). New Maine Nat. Bank v. Gendron,
    780 F.Supp. 52 (D. Me. 1992). The court held that defendants were entitled to rescind loan under
    strict liability terms of TILA because plaintiff violated TILA’s provisions.
    STANDING
    The legal right to initiate a lawsuit. To do so, a person must be sufficiently affected by the matter
    at hand, and there must be a case or controversy that can be resolved by legal action.There are
    three requirements for Article III standing: (1) injury in fact, which means an invasion of a
    legally protected interest that is (a) concrete and particularized, and (b) actual or imminent, not
    conjectural or hypothetical; (2) a causal relationship between the injury and the challenged
    conduct, which means that the injury fairly can be traced to the challenged action of the
    defendant, and has not resulted from the independent action of some third party not before the
    court; and (3) a likelihood that the injury will be redressed by a favorable decision, which means
    that the prospect of obtaining relief from the injury as a result of a favorable ruling is not too
    speculative. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 112 S. Ct. 2130, 2136 (1992) (Lujan). The party
    invoking federal jurisdiction bears the burden of establishing each of these elements. Id.
    See Also:
    http://jennaison.hubpages.com/hub/VoidOrders

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